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Abstract
This article examines controversy in Russian and foreign historiography of the famine of 1932-1933 in the USSR, 
and argues that this famine was a common tragedy of the people of the USSR and not genocide against the Ukrainian 
people as argued by some researchers in the Ukraine and other countries. The concept of genocide through starva-
tion of the Ukrainian people emerged in the USA, Canada and Poland in the 1930s and was supported by the U.S. 
President R. Reagan in the early 1980s, becoming one of the symbols of the Cold War. Numerous reliable sources 
published in Russia in recent years have indicated that the famine of 1932-1933 was the result of the policy of collec-
tivization and grain procurement conducted under Stalin's leadership in the early 1930s in the grain regions of the 
USSR. These areas became the epicenter of the famine because bread was removed from these areas for the needs of 
industrialization (grain export, supply, etc.). In these areas, the population suffered equally from hunger regardless of 
their nationality, as shown by an article on the Ukraine and the Lower Volga. The article emphasizes that the famine 
in the Ukraine was the result not only of the policy of central government, but also of regional leadership. The main 
conclusion of the article is that the famine of 1932-1933 had regional peculiarities and was not the result of the na-
tional policies of the Stalinist leadership.
Keywords : famine,genocide,Ukraine,USSR,collectivization,nationalism
Whether the famine of 1932-1933 was a result of the national policies of Stalinism is one of the most 
controversial problems in Russian and western historiography. Some supporters of this view claim that 
Stalinist policy in Soviet Ukraine was to starve the Ukrainians to death because they were perceived as the 
most dangerous enemies of Stalin’s regime, leading to the Ukrainian holodomor genocide of 1932-1933（注1）. 
In disputing this view, I discuss national aspects of Stalinist agrarian policy in detail, and argue that the 
Stalinist government applied a universal policy to all Soviet villages without regard to national background.
For the last 20 years I have studied the USSR famine of 1932-1933（注 2） in detail  as part of my work as a 
research supervisor of an international project of the Federal Archival Agency of Russia “The USSR Famine. 
1929-1934.” A documentary series of the same name contains documents on the subject from central and re-
gional archives of Russia, Belorussia, Kazakhstan and others（注 3）. This archive  provides evidence that that 
the famine of 1932-1933 was a tragedy common to all USSR nations. It was not a genocide of any particular 
Soviet nation（注 4）. Rather, as it seems likely that there was no national background, it makes more sense to 
talk about regional or national-and-regional peculiarities, not national characteristics of the hunger.
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Contemporary historians began to study the famine of 1932-1933 as a result of Stalinist national policy 
in the years directly following the tragedy as can be seen in the “International Reaction to the USSR Fam-
ine”（注 5） of the third volume of “The USSR Famine.” According to these documents, it was politicians, not 
historians, who laid the grounds for the modern concept of there being a national aspect to Stalin’s policy 
which led to the USSR famine of 1932-1933. These politicians were critics and opponents of Stalinism in 
the 1930s from abroad. In fact, the idea of the “Ukrainian Holodomor Genocide,” the terms “Holodomor” 
and “Soviet-Russian Holodomor” and others were created by Ukrainian communities of the USA, Canada 
and Poland.
A letter of John Theodorovich, the archbishop of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church in Philadelphia, 
which dates back to September, 1933, is of great importance and is published in the 3rd volume of the “The 
USSR Famine” series.  There’s a very interesting phrase expressing the idea of modern followers of the 
“Ukrainian Holodomor Genocide” concept: “Moscow communist government wants to get rid of the Ukrai-
nian peasants as determined opponents of the regime at any price. It intends to found a kind of modern Sa-
maria instead of Ukraine under the principle of all nations mixing, the Mongols and the Semites in particu-
lar, to destroy the Ukrainian nation’s drive to sovereignty and a national free life”（注 6）. 
Ironically, another “author” of the idea of the national aspect of the USSR famine of 1932-1933 is Stalin 
himself, or more accurately, the Stalinist regime. The 3rd volume of the series contains documents concern-
ing the case of the March in 1933 on the so-called “All-Ukrainian Rebel Combat Organization,” whose 
members worked in the systems of the Narkomzem and Tractorocenter of Ukraine. The people were shot 
for their attempt “to establish a Ukrainian national bourgeois democratic republic by means of a peasants’ 
revolt and intervention”（注 7）. Analysis of the interrogation protocols reveals that this prosecution was ac-
tually falsification of security officials fulfilling an order（注 8）. This helped Stalin’s regime to “pass the 
buck” and find “scapegoats” for the collapse of Ukrainian agriculture of 1932-1933. It was part of Stalin’s 
struggle against sabotage and “public enemies” in Soviet agriculture. Thoughtful researchers should not take 
it seriously.
Analysis of the national aspect of the tragedy of 1932-1933 in the USSR reveals an important fact to 
modern society and those specialists who support the idea of the Ukrainian Holodomor Genocide by the 
Stalinist regime. Public organizations in western countries campaigning in 1933 against Stalin’s criminal 
policy toward Soviet villages did not influence economic and diplomatic relations between these countries 
and the Soviet Union（注 9）. Even at the protest company peak against the USSR famine (January-August, 
1933) the Soviet Union remained the most important trade partner for Western Europe and the USA 
emerging from an economic crisis. Western European countries continued to buy Soviet grain and supply 
industrial machinery to the USSR（注 10）, though less than usual. The paradox is that in 1933, at the peak 
of the tragedy when millions of Soviet people died, the USSR had achieved its greatest success in the sphere 
of diplomacy and strengthened its international position. On December 28, 1933, in his speech at the 4th 
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session of the Central Executive Committee of the Soviet Union (CEC of the USSR) known as “On the In-
ternational Situation of the Soviet Union” Molotov proudly declared: “The greatest success of USSR foreign 
policy is the resumption of relations with the USA, Herriot’s visit, the conclusion of a treaty of non-aggres-
sion, neutrality and friendship with Italy, the resumption of relations with Spain and Uruguay initiated by 
these countries.” He also mentioned that in 1933 the USSR initiated the conclusion of non-aggression pacts 
with Poland, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Czechoslovakia, Turkey, and Afghanistan, which con-
demned the use of military force in the sphere of international relations（注 11）.
The responsibility of western countries for the USSR tragedy in 1932-1933 should be examined because 
business and geopolitical interests seemed to be more important for them than humanitarian problems or 
human rights.
The ideological work of OUN-UPA during World War II supports the idea that the origins of the Ukrai-
nian Holodomor Genocide concept were purely political. Holodomor was not a significant event either for 
it or for the Nazis in their attempt “to free” Ukraine from Bolshevism（注 12）. The idea became very impor-
tant only at the beginning of the 1980s when US President Reagan called the USSR “the Evil Empire.” Dem-
chenko, the 1st secretary of the USSR Embassy in the USA, for the USSR Ministry of Foreign Policy wrote a 
briefing note in December 18, 1985 (now in the 3rd volume of “the USSR Famine” documentary series under 
the title “On the formation of the USA Congress committee aiming to study the reasons and consequences 
of the so-called “great Ukrainian famine of 1932-1933”（注 13）) that indicates that the Ukrainian Holodo-
mor genocide idea was the result of escalation of the Cold War. This opinion was imposed by administrative 
means . President Yushchenko popularized this idea and it was then taken up by international organiza-
tions, trying to accuse modern Russia. That is how the USSR famine of 1932-1933 became known as the 
“Holodomor Genocide.”
Delivering a speech at the 1st Stalinism history conference, O.A. Chubarian, an outstanding Russian ex-
pert, pointed out the need to study Stalinism in the context of the epoch, i.e. from a historical perspective, 
to take into account the international situation（注 14）.
This approach to the problem of the USSR famine in 1932-1933 is widely followed by an international 
group of historians and demographists formed by the Australian scholar, S. Wheatcroft, to work on the 
project “World Famine of the XX c..” I am also a member of this group（注 15）. Based on many documents, 
he claims that no colonial country demanded any moral or financial benefits from different international 
organizations as patiently as Ukraine did. Meanwhile, there were many more famine victims in India during 
the period of British rule than in Ukraine during the Soviet period（注 16）. 
There was famine in China and Africa. J. De Castro, a UN expert in food supplies questions, wrote the 
book “Geography of Hunger” about them after World War II（注 17）. Why is it that these famines do not at-
tract the attention of the global community, and why is the Ukrainian famine of 1932-1933 considered so 
important? 
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What are the arguments against the idea that the USSR famine of 1932-1933 was the result of Stalinist 
national policy and why is the phrase “common tragedy of the USSR nations” preferred? Furthermore, why 
should we pay attention to regional peculiarities, not national ones?
So far researchers have found no documents showing the intention of Stalin’s regime to use starvation to 
reduce the population of particular USSR nations（注 18）. Some researchers say that Stalin covered his trac-
es, did not sign official papers, and did not issue such orders directly, but documents in the Russian Federa-
tion President Archive refute these claims. Many documents on “the USSR Famine. 1929-1934” have been 
declassified and will be published uncut with the support of the Russian Humanitarian Science Foundation.
Stalin never attempted to cover his traces. He was a plain dealer. This has been pointed out by Moshe 
Lewin, one of the most competent experts on the problem（注 19）. I have not found any documents of Stalin’s 
government containing strong language about the Ukrainians, Kazakhs or Russian as national groups that 
should be punished by means of hunger or anything else. This viewpoint appeared during the war years.
The most interesting point is that there are no documents supporting the statement about the national 
aspect in performing agricultural policy related to the 1st five-year plan period. There are real state orders, 
not declarations. The situation is quite the opposite: everybody was brought to a common average standard. 
All resolutions about collectivization and grain requisition of the central secret instructions level were very 
similar（注 20）. Economic specialization of each region was more important for Stalin’s government. He did 
not think about nationalities. The Russians, Ukrainians or Jews were all the same to him. The situation in 
the Central Chernozem region supports this statement.  In 1933, the grain districts, where the Ukrainians 
traditionally lived, suffered greatly from the famine（注 21）.
Some scholars say that the rural population of Kuban is Ukrainian because Kuban is the genocide terri-
tory and the rural population speaks Ukrainian. What do they call themselves now and what then? In fact, 
they are Cossacks from Ukraine! And the ethnicity of the Cossacks is still controversial.
Some researches take Stalin’s words out of context in an attempt to explain the Ukrainian Holodomor 
genocide. S.V.  Kulchitsky, the leading Ukrainian expert in the subject of the famine 1932-1933, and his col-
leagues look upon I.V. Stalin’s letter to L.M. Kaganovich dated 11 August, 1932 as the main base for their con-
cept of the “Ukrainian Holodomor genocide.” The Soviet leader said: “The most important now is Ukraine… 
If we don’t start to control the situation in the Ukraine right now, we can lose the Ukraine”（注 22）. 
Many Ukrainian scholars have omitted the first two items of the letter（注 23）. In my opinion, this is no 
accident. These items are about really important things for Stalin, first of all the “Law of 5 Spikelets” (The 
Decree “About protection of the property of state enterprises, kolkhozes and cooperatives, and the strength-
ening of public (socialist) property” dated 7 August, 1932). In the letter, Stalin points out that this law 
turned out to be “quite good” and up to date. According to the letter, the Soviet leader worried greatly about 
applying this “law.” The second item of the letter contains information about the usage of grain fodder and 
locomotives-the questions he is going to discuss with Kaganovich in Moscow. And only then are there Sta-
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lin’s ideas about the Ukraine. But there is no mention of draconian measures to say nothing about “the Ho-
lodomor genocide.” Stalin seems much more worried about the situation on the border between the USSR 
and hostile Poland, as mentioned at the end of the letter (“economic and political strengthening of the 
Ukraine and primarily its border districts”). Rather, this letter reveals Stalin’s intention to strengthen the 
Ukrainian state machine and the economic system of the republic. If he intended repression, he would not 
have sent Ukrainian leaders to Moscow to be given high ranks or spoke about the need to give as many re-
sources to the Ukrainian SSR as possible (“spare no expense”).
So why were regional or national-and-regional aspects more important than national aspects? 
Documents open to researchers clearly show that the Soviet Ukraine was a huge agricultural region with 
a historical specialization in grain production. The majority of the population of this area was Ukrainian. 
They were affected by Stalin’s policies because they were grain growers, not because they were Ukrainians. 
The situation was the same in the RSFSR in 1932-1933 when the Russians, Kazakhs, Germans and the Mor-
dovians   suffered because they were grain growers and breeders. This tragedy was common for a Soviet vil-
lage, which was sacrificed for the needs of forced industrialization（注 24）. 
When understanding the famine of 1932-1933, the events in grain country regions and Kazakhstan are 
important. The Stalinist regime pressed them greatly because of the need for industrialization and because 
it was necessary to conserve the kolkhoz system, which had been organized there in a great rush and at 
enormous cost. Researchers have not found any other reasons.
Trying to prove the idea of a national aspect to Stalin’s policy, different scholars put forward numbers of 
the famine victims in Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Russia. The reported number of deaths is huge: from 5 to 19 
million people. Many Ukrainians, Russians, Kazakhs and others starved to death during the USSR famine of 
1932-1933 but many more Ukrainians and Kazakhs starved than any other peoples. 
What are the origins of this large number of reported Ukrainian victims? The 3rd volume of “The USSR 
Famine” series states the numbers of USSR famine victims, including Ukrainians, taken from the “New York 
Times” articles dated 15 June and 4 August 1934. They were announced by different western public figures 
of that time（注 25）. Those are “primary sources.” 
Some specialists claim that the Soviet system of population registry (Central Administration of Eco-
nomic Accounting (CAEA)-Civil Registry) collapsed, and suggest that this explains the numerous famine 
victims in Ukrainian SSR in 1933. They also claim that mass population mortality was not registered and 
that the Stalinist regime hid the real numbers. Based on this thesis, they present the following figures: 7-10 
million victims in total, including 3-5 million in Ukrainian SSR.
The documents from the section “Demographical consequences of the Famine” of the 3rd volume of 
“The USSR Famine” series (arranged by S. Wheatcroft and V.B. Zhiromskaya) discredit the above viewpoint 
about the collapse of the Soviet system of population registry at the peak of the tragedy（注 26）. Rather, 
document analysis reveals that this system was working during the period of the 1st five-year plan. Available 
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demographical data with some corrections allow more adequate numbers of the famine victims to be de-
rived, including regional information. They are as follows: 3.5 million for the Ukraine and other Russian re-
gions, and no less than 1 million for Kazakhstan（注 27）.
Reliable data of demographical statistics casts doubt on one of the main arguments of the followers of 
the Ukrainian Holodomor genocide concept and strengthens the idea that the famine had regional pecu-
liarities.
S.V. Kulchitsky always said that the Ukrainian Holodomor had such terrible consequences there because 
in January 1933, Stalin’s envoys and their assistants confiscated all kinds of food, not only grain in the 
Ukraine（注 28）. To support his idea he appeals to witness evidence, not to any central instructions（注 29）. 
In his opinion, people died because they were Ukrainian. According to him, Stalin’s government wanted to 
prevent them from leaving the USSR in 1932 and establishing an independent Ukraine, and  decided to 
punish them and starve them to death by taking all food out of the region.
 But if only grain was seized, as S.V. Kulchitsky claims, why did several hundred peasants starve to death 
in 1933 in the territory of the Lower Volga region? Why were there acts of cannibalism? Why did people 
bury their neighbors in common graves as famine victims?（注 30）
Using S.V. Kulchitsky’s statement, it is difficult to explain the fact that the peak of the population mor-
tality in Ukraine was in April-June of 1933 as well as in other grain regions of the USSR including the Lower 
Volga. 
According to reliable demographical statistics, people in the Ukraine lived without any food for some 
months from January 1933 (Tables 1, 2).
Table1　NaturalpopulationmovementintheUkrainianSSRbymonthfor1933
Month
Total amount of the dead Postneonatal mortality
Male Female Total of male and female Male Female
Total of male 
and female
     16     17      18    20    21    22
January   35752  25274   61026  3843  2830  6673
February   51673  30211   81884  4261  3131  7392
March  118505  59480  177985  6356  4703 11059
April  155388  78890  234278  5653  4350 10003
May  211133 119535  330668  5722  4240  9962
June  259299 167995  427294  5794  4353 10147
July  187062 122408  309470  6091  4638 10729
August   56595  58458  115053  5041  3999  9040
September   36706  26074   62780  3355  2565  5920
October   21124  18299   39423  2682  2023  4705
November   17731  15412   33143  1973  1526  3499
December   18982  16921   35903  1930  1363  3293
Year 1169950 738957 1908907 52701 39721 92422
RGAE (Russian State Archive of the Economy). Fund 1562. Series 329. File 17. Pages 241-241(overleaf).
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Table2　Decrease ofmortality among rural populations of the Lower Volga Region
andtheUkrainianSSRin1932and1933inpercentageterms(basedonCivil
RegistryOfficematerials).
Lower Volga Region Ukrainian SSR
1932 1933 1933 to  1932(%) 1932 1933
1933 to  
1932(%)
Registered mortality Registered mortality
January  3408   5390 158 January  31691   43901 138
February  3416   6892 202 February  35404   60632 171
March  3616  12750 352 March  43100  135767 315
April  3483  18955 544 April  46617  174202 373
May  3502  30170 861 May  50401  253155 502
June  4070  31635 777 June  55293  361195 653
July  5289  28753 544 July  52818  278789 528
August  4768  15555 326 August  47939  103319 215
September  4766   9059 190 September  43265   65649 152
October  4201   6832 163 October  47083   42820  91
November  3659   4738 129 November  38716   28167  73
December  3771   4875 129 December  34801   34421  99
One year average 47949 175604 366 One year average 527134 1582017 300
Source: Russian State Archive of the Economy (RGAE). Fund 1562. Series 329. File 17. Pages 19, 56, 136; 
Станịслав Кульчицький. Демографічні наслідки голодомору 1933 р. в Украïні. Геннадій Ефіменко. 
Всесоюзний перепис 1937 р. в Украϊні: документи та матеріали. Киïв, 2003. С. 46.
According to S.V. Kulchitsky’s logic, the most sorrowful period for the Ukraine was February-March of 
1933! But in fact it was later. How can this be?
  Speaking about 300 thousand famine victims in the Volga region, opponents usually say that there was 
no famine in Russia at all, or it was much less severe in comparison with that in the Ukraine or Kazakhstan
（注 31）. S.V. Kulchitsky, for example, argues that there were two different famines in the USSR in 1932-
1933: one is the Ukrainian Holodomor, the other is a famine outside the region of Ukraine (with a proviso 
for Kazakhstan).
From this viewpoint, it is difficult to explain the same excess mortality level in the grain regions of the 
USSR in 1933 taking into account the rate of its increase. Reliable and easy to check data on the subject are 
given below (Tables 3-6).
What do these numbers tell us? The famine in the Ukraine and in the grain Volga regions was of the 
same severity. The difference is in the numbers of rural population who lived in each region.
The most difficult and less studied problem is the Kazakhstan famine（注 32）. The people who starved 
there in 1932-1933 were not only the Kazakhs（注 33）. For example, plenipotentiary in Kazakhstan to F.I. 
Goloschekin, the secretary of a Kazakh district committee the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, 
in his message about the Pavlodar famine to the Unified State Political Department (OGPU), dated 11 Janu-
ary 1932, states: “By accounts of the Semipalatinsk special sector, 14 members of kolkhoz died from hunger 
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Table3　RuralpopulationoftheLowerVolga(LVR)andMiddleVolgaregions(MVR)
according to the CAEA of the USSR on 1 January, 1933 and 1 January,
1935.Thepercentageofthepopulationdeclineinthesameperiod.
According to CAEA Acc. to agricultural 
fiscal accounting of 
1935
Acc. to the develop-





% on 1 
January, 
1933
On 1  
January, 
1933
On 1  
January, 
1935
LVR The Kuibyshev 
region  5327,5 4439,8 4391,2 4542,3 -785,2 15
The Orenburg 
region  1359,3 1040,1 1069,1  935,4 -423,9 31,2
MVR The Saratov 
region  2281,3 1589,3 1583,3 1556,2 -725,1 32
The Stalingrad 
region  1837,2 1506,9 1518,8 1520,7 -316,5 17,2
10805,3 8576,1 8562,4 8554,6 2250,7 21




According to CAEA 
on 1 January, 1933
Acc. to the development of 
national population move-
ment in 1934.
Decline of population 
on 1 January, 1935.
 % on 1  
January,  
1933
The Vinnytsia region  4407,5  3595,9  811,6 18,4
The Dnepropetrovsk 
region  2844,7  2375,4  469,3 16,5
The Donetsk region  1876,4  1682,0  194,4 10
The Kiev region  5142,7  3700,6 1442,1 28
The Odessa region  2359,9  1957,1  402,8 17
The Kharkov region  4877,4  3461,0 1416,4 29
The Chernigov region  2682,3  2125,4  556,9 21
The Moldavian ASSR   551,8   450,3  101,5 18
The Ukrainian SSR 24742,7 19347,7 5395,0 22
Sources: RGAE. Fund 1562. Series 329. File 49. Page 161.
in aulsoviet No.11 in the Pavlodar region; 2 members of kolkhoz also died and 6 families are swelling from 
it in the German kolkhoz “Rota Fane””（注 34）. 
The same information is contained in another document, known as a memorandum of Alma-Ata city 
council chair (predgorsovet) about taking to the hospital and burying of the dead found on the city streets 





Former districts of 
the Lower Volga and Middle Volga regions
Rural population acc. to the 
census of 1926
Rural population acc. to the 
census of 1937
1937 to 1926(%)
The Kuibyshev region  3704388 2950886 79,7
The Moldavian ASSR  1212565 1102955 91,0
The Orenburg region  1280852 1196649 93,4
The Saratov region  2032247 1209330 59,5
The Volga German ASSR   495875  366802 74,0
The Stalingrad region  1685255 1375596 81,6
LVR and MVR in total 10411182 8202218 79,8




Rural population acc. to the 
census of 1926
Rural population acc. to the 
census of 1937.
1937 to 1926(%)
The Vinnytsia region  3829831  3456669 90,3
The Kiev region  4748237  3786939 79,8
The Chernigov region  2444022  2194462 89,8
The Kharkov region  4747282  3469456 73,1
The Donetsk region  2032386  1392845 68,5
The Dnepropetrovsk region  2916426  2152859 73,8
The Odessa region  2455291  1899485 77,4
The Moldavian ASSR   489638   473127 96,6
The Ukrainian SSR 23663113 18825842 79,6
Sources: Vsesojuznaya perepis’ naselenija SSSR 1937. Kratkie itogi. M., 1991. P. 48-59.
writing to let you know that corpses from Alma-Ata city streets were taken to the dead-house every day. On 
15 March, 1933 12 corpses were taken (5 Kazakhs and 7 Europeans). On 10 March there were 17 corpses (11 
Kazakhs and 6 Europeans)”（注 35）. 
The Kazakhs literature contains information about 1-2 million people who died from Stalin’s hunger
（注 36）, but why have no Kazakhstan mass graves of the famine victims been found? Where are the traces 
of the tragedy? In Ukraine memorialization took place. Common graves can be found in practically every 
village, and memorials and memorial signs have been set up. Interestingly, such evidence is hard to find in 
Russia. Such memorials are a tribute to the Ukrainian government. There’s no other place in the world 
where recollections about famine victims are of such importance.
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tain information about the mass mortality of the Kazakhs not on the steppes, but in kolkhoz, populated lo-
calities, in the places from where they started out on their way to Russian regions and on the way back home 
to Kazakhstan（注 37）. But the issue is not millions of people. 
Kazakhs are normal people. It is difficult to imagine that they rushed into the steppes to commit collec-
tive suicide.  Instead, at the time of famine they tried to be close to people with a wish for salvation（注 38）. 
That’s why the question about the number of famine victims requires further study. S. Wheatcroft examined 
this issue in Astana as a visiting professor in Nazarbaev University.
When considering the regional peculiarities of the famine, it is necessary to note the specifics of produc-
ing and consuming regions and take into account macro and micro levels of the problems (the level of re-
public, region, village, family). These items were clearly described by Amartya Sen, the Nobel prize winner, 
concerning the Indian Famine, and by Cormack O’Garda using the example of the Irish Potato Famine
（注 39）. In the context of the relations between central and local government, republic and regional elites 
should also be mentioned.
This method reveals why there were so many famine victims in Ukraine in 1933 in the Kiev and Khar-
kov regions. For example, the lack of central procurement of the Kiev population led to local authorities 
confiscating grain from local resources in 1932. This resulted in mass mortality in Ukrainian cities without 
any industry（注 40）.
The reason for the enormous number of Ukrainian victims in 1933 includes not only central policy, but 
also the behavior of S. Keasior, its arrogant party leader. In 1932 he hid the scale of the republic’s agricultural 
crisis. He did not want to acknowledge the Ukrainian tragedy even at the beginning of 1933（注 41）.
Thus, a regional approach to the problem, based on comprehensive analysis of reliable and various 
sources, helps to provide a well-balanced and scientifically-grounded estimate of the tragedy of the former 
USSR nations in 1932-1933.
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